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The introduction of the civil liability legislation has led to much discussion as to its application to 
claims for personal injury arising from trespass to the person. The legislation varies in the Australian 
jurisdictions, but in many the pleading of intention has become significant if a claim for personal 
injuries may be made out in either trespass or negligence. This is because in some jurisdictions, 
intentional acts do not come within the operation of the civil liability legislation and therefore the 
limits and restrictions placed upon the assessment of damages do not apply. 
The legislation in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory applies to all claims for 
personal injury damages, so would also apply to claims in trespass.i  In Queensland s 4 of the Civil 
Liability Act 2003 states that the Act applies to ‘any civil claim for damages for harm’ and therefore it 
would appear that the limitations in the Act apply to trespass actions. Section 51 of the Civil Liability 
Act 1936 (SA) provides that the Act applies to damages for personal injury arising from negligence or 
‘some other unintentional tort’. This would appear to remove personal injury claims arising from an 
intentional tort from the Act’s ambit.  Claims for personal injury for intentional torts committed with 
the intent to cause death or injury are excluded from the legislation in New South Wales,ii 
Tasmania,iii Victoriaiv and Western Australia.v 
The New South Wales Court of Appeal has now been required to consider the application of the Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW) in relation to this issue a few times. The most recent case is Croucher v 
Cachia.vi  
 
An Intentional Act vs An intention to Injure 
All actions in trespass require that the defendant be at fault if they are to be liable. Fault is 
established if the defendant either committed the trespass intentionally or carelessly. Trespass 
actions are often referred to as intentional torts, but this can be misleading as negligence or 
carelessness on the part of the defendant may also result in liability. Australia has not adopted the 
English position that the trespass must be intentional to be a trespass, remaining with the directness 
of the interference as the distinguishing characteristic between trespass and actions on the case.vii  
It is now clear that the fact that a plaintiff may claim in trespass, does not automatically exclude the 
application of the civil liability legislation in New South Wales. In Dean v Phung,viii the Court of 
Appeal noted that there was a distinction between establishing an action in trespass and application 
of the Civil Liability Act 2002.  Section 3B(1)(a) of the Act provides: 
(1) The provisions of this Act do not apply to or in respect of civil liability (and awards of 
damages in those proceedings) as follows: 
(a) civil liability of a person in respect of an intentional act that is done by the person 
with intent to cause injury or death or that is sexual assault or other sexual misconduct 
committed by the person… 
The section focuses on the intention of the defendant, not on the cause of action. For example, 
Basten JA noted (Beazley and Macfarlan JJA agreeing): 
… the language of para (a) read as a whole is not suggestive of concepts having some specific 
legal connotation, but is rather language which encompassed a broad policy objective. Thus, 
subject to the limited express exceptions, the purpose was to leave those who committed 
intentional torts to the operation of the general law.ix 
In White v Johnson,x Leeming J noted that the trial judge had mistakenly proceeded on the basis that 
s 3B(1)(a) applied to any intentional tort. This approach overlooks the fact that what are referred to 
as the intentional torts, that is the trespass actions, do not require proof that the defendant 
intended to injure the plaintiff, the question is whether the interference was intentional, not the 
injury.xi The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had not made any finding on the point of 
whether the appellant intended to cause injury, and as the evidence before the Appeal Court did not 
indicate such evidence, it could not be held that the appellant intended to cause injury and 
therefore the Act did apply. This decision highlights the need for the evidence of intention to be 
examined carefully. 
Croucher v Cachia 
The facts of the case were that the appellant and respondent were neighbours with a history of 
antagonistic behaviour. The trial judge heard evidence that the respondent cut some of the 
appellant’s hedge and so the appellant cut some branches off the respondent’s hedge. There was an 
exchange of words, including a threat of physical violence by the respondent, and during the 
altercation the appellant injured the respondent with his gardening shears. The respondent claimed 
in battery and negligence. The trial judge described the conduct of the appellant as ‘reckless’, and 
held that a battery had been committed. It was also held that the self-defence provision under the 
Act did not apply as the conduct of the respondent had not been unlawful.xii   
In assessing the damages for personal injury, the trial judge did not refer to s 3B(1)(a) of the Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW).  On appeal, Leeming JA noted that the trial judge appeared to have 
proceeded on the basis that an action of battery engages s 3B(1)(a) and therefore was exempted 
from the application of the Act.xiii However, ‘s 3B(1)(a) looks to the nature of the conduct found to 
occur, rather than to the cause of action which has been pleaded’.xiv Therefore the issue was not 
whether the appellant had committed battery, but whether it was an intentional act done with the 
intent to cause injury or death. As fault in battery may be intentional or carelessness, a careless 
battery would clearly not be within the application of the Act, but an intentional battery may be. But 
is a reckless act within the ambit of s 3B(1)(a)? 
Recklessness 
The issue of a reckless battery and the application of the civil liability legislation was left unresolved 
by New South Wales Court of Appeal in Dean v Phungxv and White v Johnson.xvi   Unfortunately due 
to the grounds of the appeal in Croucher v Cachia,xvii the focus was on whether the appellant’s 
conduct could be found to be reckless on the evidence, and this issue remains unresolved. 
 
Leeming JA considered that when read as a whole, the trial judge had found that the act was 
intentional.  His Honour stated: 
 
It is far from clear that conduct which is reckless, even if it amounts to an ‘intentional tort’ 
such as battery, engages s 3B(1)(a). It is perfectly clear that a battery which involves merely 
negligent conduct will not engage s 3B(1)(a). This is because, as noted above, s 3B(1)(a) looks 
to the nature of the conduct found to occur, rather than to the cause of action which has 
been pleaded. 
 
Basten JA referred to the ‘somewhat awkward terminology of s 3B’ in State of New South 
Wales v Ibbett [2005] NSWCA 445; 65 NSWLR 168 at [197]. In Hayer v Kam [2014] NSWSC 
126, when dealing with a strike out application, Hoeben CJ at CL expressed the view that, 
subject to authority, he would have accepted the submission that s 3B(1)(a) ‘excluded any 
reliance upon concepts such as ‘recklessness’’: at [38]-[39], a view which I regard as being 
not without force. However, even so his Honour regarded an allegation of recklessness as 
sufficiently arguable not to be struck out. It may also be noted that D Villa, Annotated Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (2nd ed, 2013, Lawbook Co) at 55-56 notes that the position is 
unclear but expresses the view that ‘it would be consistent with the purpose of the exclusion 
that recklessness be sufficient for the purposes of s 3B(1)(a)’.xviii 
 
His Honour was of the opinion that the trial judge had found the appellant’s conduct to be recklessly 
indifferent to the possibility that opening and shutting his gardening shears and thrusting them 
towards the respondent would cause injury, but there was no intention to injure the respondent.xix 
 
Self-defence under the Act 
Due to the trial judge’s reasons for rejecting the application of self-defence under s 52 of the Act, the 
Court of Appeal ordered a retrial if court-annexed mediation was not successful.  As noted above, 
the trial judge had held that the self-defence provision, s 52, did not apply as the conduct of the 
respondent to which the appellant was responding, was not unlawful.xx However, her Honour also 
considered the remaining requirements of the statutory defence and held that there was no 
evidence as to whether the appellant believed his conduct was reasonable or not, and finally, that 
the use of the shears was not a reasonable response in the circumstances. This approach was held 
by the Court of Appeal not to be correct. 
 
In New South Wales v McMasterxxi it was held that the reference to ‘unlawful’ included not only 
criminal conduct, but also tortious conduct. In Croucher v Cachia,xxii Leeming JA stated that this did 
not only mean that the elements of the tortious action were established, but also there was no 
defence. The trial judge had erred in finding that the respondent’s conduct was not unlawful, as it 
was clear that she equated this with criminal.xxiii The evidence was that the respondent had thrown 
his gardening shears to the ground and strode towards the appellant making a verbal threat. A 
threat, if it raises an apprehension that a battery is about to be committed, is the trespass action of 
assault.xxiv The evidence was that the appellant had apprehended that he would be struck by the 
respondent, for example, upon being approached the appellant held up his shears and took some 
steps backwards.xxv By rejecting this as evidence inferring what the appellant thought, the trial judge 
was not applying the required subjective test.xxvi To establish a defence to the assault, the 
respondent would have to establish his belief that the threat was necessary to protect his property, 
which required ‘quite nuanced findings of [the respondent’s] state of mind as he approached [the 
appellant]’.xxvii Therefore the judgment of the District Court disclosed error, but the Court of Appeal 
could not determine whether the defence could be made out due to the insufficient factual findings 
as to the appellant’s state of mind.xxviii 
 
The Court of Appeal also noted that there was no consideration of s 53(1) of the Act that provides 
that if s 52 does not apply because the conduct was not a reasonable response in the circumstances, 
a court is not to award damages against that person in respect of that conduct unless there are 
exceptional circumstances and a failure to award damages would be harsh and unjust. In such 
circumstances the Act applies to the assessment of damages and no damages for non-economic loss 
may be awarded.xxix Leeming JA was of the opinion that the trial judge had treated the lack of 
reasonable response as dispositive upon the ‘most natural reading’, and in those circumstances it 
would be necessary ‘to deal with s 53, for only if satisfied under s 53 was [the respondent] entitled 




Croucher v Cachiaxxxi again highlights the need for evidence of intention to be examined closely when 
considering the application of the Civil Liability Act 2002 to claims in trespass to person. The use of 
accepted legal terms in the legislation is clearly not to be interpreted as requiring their particular 
legal meaning. If a direct interference that has resulted in personal injury gives rise to a claim in both 
trespass to the person and negligence, the perceived strategic benefits in pursuing the trespass 
action may not always come to fruition.  
 
Due to the different wording in the civil liability legislation throughout Australia, the relevance of 
intention will differ.  The legislation in the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory and 
Queensland will apply to claims of personal injury damages whether or not the act was negligent or 
a trespass.  In South Australia, the Act applies to claims arising from negligence or unintentional acts, 
which may mean that if the injury is the result of an intentional act, that is, not one due to a lack of 
reasonable care, the limitations upon the assessment of damages do not apply.xxxii  As noted above, 
evidence of intention is most relevant for New South Wales, Tasmania, Western Australia and 
Victoria and it requires attention to not only that there was a trespass and the fault of the defendant 
is established by intention, but also whether there was an intention to cause injury or death.  
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